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LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - BARRATRY AND MAINTENANCE - "ANTI-LmiGAToN"
STATUTES IN VIRGINIA - The Virginia Assembly, in Chapters 31 through 36 of
the 1956 Executive Session Laws, required certain organizations to register with
the state and regulated the practice of law. The National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc., sought declaratory judgments on the constitutionality and applicability of
these statutes to their organizations. In NAACP v. Patty,1 a three-judge court2
held Chapters 31 and 32, requiring the NAACP and the Fund to register with the
state, and Chapter 35, defining the crime of barratry, unconstitutional. The court
refused to pass upon the constitutionality of Chapters 33 and 36, containing anti-
solicitation provisions, until they had been constructed by a state court. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the three-judge court, holding that the federal court
could not pass upon the constitutionality of any of the statutes until they had been
construed by a state court.3 The NAACP and the Fund then sought a declaratory
judgment in the state court. From a lower court holding that Chapters 33 and 36
were constitutional and applicable to the plaintiff organizations, an appeal was
taken to the Supreme Court of Virginia. Held; Chapter 334 is a valid exercise of
the state police power to regulate the practice of law and is applicable to the
NAACP and the Fund; Chapter 36 violates the Virginia Bill of Rights and the
first amendment of the United States Constitution.5 National Ass'n for the Advance-
ment of Colored People v. Harrison, 116 S.E.2d 55 (Va. 1960).
1 159 F. Supp. 503 (E.D. Va. 1958).
2 28 U.S.C. § 2281.
3 Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959).
4 The statute in this particular:
Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Virginia:
1. That §§ 54-74, 54-78, 54-79 of the Code of Virginia be amended
and re-enacted as follows:
§ 54-74...(6) "Any malpractice, or any unlawful or dishonest or unworthy or
corrupt or unprofessional conduct," as used in this section, shall be con-
strued to include the improper solicitation of any legal or professional
business or employment, either directly or indirectly, or the acceptance of
employment, retainer, compensation or costs from any person, partnership,
corporation, organization or association with knowledge that such person,
partnership, corporation, organization or association has violated any pro-
vision of article 7 of this Chapter, . . . ; provided, however, that nothing
contained in this article shall be construed to in any way prohibit any
attorney from accepting employment to defend any person, partnership,
corporation, or association accused of violating the provision of article 7
of this chapter. (Emphasis added.)
§ 54-78. As used in this article:
(1) "a runner" or "capper" is any person, corporation, partnership,
or association acting in any manner or in any capacity as an agent for an
attorney at law within this State, or for any person, partnership, corpora-
tion, organization or association which employs, retains or compensates any
attorney at law in connection with any judicial proceeding in which such
person, partnership, corporation, organization or association is not a party
and in which it has no pecuniary right or liability, in the solicitation or
procurement of business for such attorney at law or for any such person,
partnership, corporation, organization or association in connection with any
judicial proceeding for which such attorney, or such person, partnership,
corporation, organization or association is employed, retained or compen-
sated. (Emphasis added.)
§ 54-79. It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation, partnership
or association to act as a runner or capper as defined in § 54-78 to solicit
any business for any attorney at law or partnership, corporation, organiza-
tion or association. (Emphasis added.)
5 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging freedom of
speech. .. ."
VA. CONST. art I, § 12: "[Alnd any citizen may freely speak, write and publish
his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
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The NAACP and the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., in
order to combat racial discrimination, encourage and aid prospective litigants to
bring suits asserting their constitutional rights. Many southern states, because of
the success of the Association and the Fund in this undertaking have enacted legisla-
tion seeking to curb the activities of the Negro groups.6 One form of such control
is enactment or broadening of "anti-litigation" statutes which may, if constitutional,
restrict the activities of the Association and the Fund in prosecuting and financing
individual litigation to achieve a group goal, i.e., elimination of discriminatory laws
and practices.7 The decision in NAACP v. Harrison is the first adjudication by a
state court concerning such statutes. Chapter 33, defining "runner" and "capper,"
is an anti-solicitation statute. The decision of the Virginia court construing this
statute as applicable to the activities of the NAACP and the Fund and declaring
it constitutional will prevent the Association from referring prospective litigants to
lawyers in the employ of the NAACP or the Fund. Furthermore, the licenses of
lawyers employed by the NAACP are subject to revocation or suspension if those
lawyers are knowingly employed by an association soliciting litigants or referring
them to attorneys in its employ. The Virginia court's determination that Chapter
36 is unconstitutional permits the plaintiffs to continue to encourage individuals to
bring suits to uphold their constitutional rights. It also allows them to contribute
financial assistance directly to the litigants. Since the decision may impede the
plaintiffs' progress in seeking adjudication of civil rights questions concerning the
conflict between the powers of the state and the rights of individuals guaranteed
by the Constitution, it is likely that the case will be appealed to the United States
Supreme Court.
At common law, conduct which tended to foster litigation was made criminal.
The common law crimes of barratry, champerty and maintenance are examples of
such criminal activity.8 The power of the states to enact laws to regulate the activi-
ties of members of the legal profession is generally recognized. 9 State regulation of
the legal profession has been upheld against the objection that it violates free
speech.' 0 Solicitation of legal business is one of the evils to be combatted by such
regulation; there is a provision in the Canons of Professional Ethics, stated in gen-
eral terms, forbidding solicitation,1 and rather stringent restrictions on the activities
of the legal profession have been enforced in many of the states, generally under
some statutory enactment.1 2 One of the more obvious evils to be remedied by such
6 Other attempts to curtail NAACP activity have been made through registration and
disclosure laws and legislative committee investigations. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Committee on Offenses,
199 Va. 665, 101 S.E.2d 631, cert. granted, cause remanded, 358 U.S. 40 (1958); The Legal
Framework of Desegregation, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 718 (1959).
7 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8 9 C.J.S., Barratry § 1 (1938): "Barratry is the crime or offense of frequently stirring
up suits or quarrels between individuals, either at law or otherwise."
14 C.J.S., Champerty and Maintenance § 1(a), (b) (1939):
(a) Champerty consists of an agreement whereby a person without
interest in another's suit undertakes to carry it on at his own expense, in
whole or in part, in consideration of receiving, in the event of success,
a part of the proceeds of the litigation.(b) Maintenance exists when a person without interest in a suit
officiously intermeddles therein by assisting either party with money or
otherwise to prosecute or defend it.
9 McCloskey v. Tobin, 252 U.S. 107 (1920).
10 Lathrop v. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d 404 (1960), docketed, 29 U.S.L.
WEEK 3039, juris. postponed, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 3101.
11 Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 28: Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through
Agents.
. 12 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958);
Hildebrand v. State of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950); Courtney v. Asso-
ciation of Real Estate Taxpayers of Illinois, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933); Hightower
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legislation is the commercialism or venality which solicitation would encourage in
members of the profession. Some state statutes, therefore, restrict themselves to for-
bidding solicitation in personal liability actions.13
A particular form of solicitation restricted by the statute in NAACP v. Har-
rison is that arising from the practice of law by a corporation, which the Canons
of Professional Ethics condemns as unauthorized practice.' 4 The proscription has
been judicially recognized in several states; precedents cited by the court in the
Harrison case are typical examples.1 5 A non-profit organization was held to be
illegally practicing law because it was organized to make available to its members
the professional services of attorneys in its employ.' 6 Cases of more restrictive state
regulations are those condemning attorneys working for unincorporated associations
which are similar to legal aid societies. 7 As announced in these cases, the tradi-
tional evils attendant upon employment of attorneys in such capacities are: (1)
solicitation of business which encourages venality; (2) destruction of the personal
relation between attorney and client; (3) control of litigation taken out of the hands
of the individual litigant (i.e., the attorney must serve a divided interest, that of
the corporation and that of the litigant himself).
The NAACP contended in this case that the statute forbidding solicitation
should not apply to its activities. It contended that the usual evils of solicitation are
not present in that (1) the objectives of individual Negro litigants are the same
as those of the Association and (2) the Association is a non-profit organization.
To support this argument the Association relied on Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 8
in which the Bar Association sought and maintained suits by private litigants against
local loan sharks. The organization's activities were not only found entirely profes-
sional by the Georgia Court but were lauded as proper conduct. The Virginia court
distinguished Gunnels on the grounds that the Bar Association contributed its
services gratuitously, a seemingly artificial distinction. In Gunnels the persons who
contributed to achieve a recognized social goal through litigation were the members
of the Bar Association who donated their professional services. In the present situa-
tion a larger and non-lawyer group of members contributed financial aid, so that
lawyer members did not need to contribute all of their services gratuitously. In
both situations, the objective -of the group was a social good. The associations in-
volved made no money in either case, though, of course, the lawyers in the instant
situation received compensation. However, the Virginia court was not alone in its
differentiation. It cites in its opinion cases as analogous to the situation under con-
sideration as is Gunnels;'9 and in those cases the courts found and condemned
solicitation. In any event, the Virginia court needed only to say that Gunnels was
not the law of Virginia. The wisdom of holding that the actions of the NAACP
and the Fund constitute solicitation, as the word is used in the Virginia statute,
is beyond the scope of this comment.20
v. Detroit Edison Co., 262 Mich. 1, 247 N.W. 97 (1933); Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v.
Davis, 111 Neb. 737, 197 N.W. 599 (1924).
13 Mcic. STAT. ANN. § 28-642 (1954); RV. N.B. STAT. § 28-739, 28-740 (1956).
14 Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 35: intermediaries.
15 Richmond Ass'n. of Credit Men Inc. v. Bar Ass'n. of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189
S.E. 153 (1937); In re Maclub of America, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936); Courtney
v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers of Ill., 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933).
16 Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers of Ill., 354 I1. 102, 187 N.E. 823
(1933).
17 In re Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958).
See note, 20 U. PrTT. L. REV. 85 (1958).
18 191 Ga. 366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940).
19 Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E. 823 (1933),
cited in 116 S.E.2d at 67; In re Maclub of America, Inc., 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272
(1936), cited in 116 S.E.2d at 67; Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50,
199 N.E. 1 (1935), cited in 116 S.E.2d at 68.
20 The wisdom and propriety of permitting various groups to assist members with legal
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The judicial task involved in construing the statute brought the court to the
question of the statute's constitutionality. The NAACP asserted that it was un-
constitutional in that it violated rights guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments. If the case goes to the United States Supreme Court, presumably
this question will be redetermined there.
The Virginia court pointed out that Chapter 33 does not deny the NAACP
the right to discuss with and advise members concerning their legal rights in matters
of racial segregation .2 The statute does bar the Association from soliciting litigants,
referring them to NAACP counsel, paying the lawyers and controlling the cases.
As the aforementioned cases indicate, however, this is a legitimate restriction upon
speech and action unless it in some other way contravenes the fourteenth amend-
ment.
Cases invalidating state acts as contrary to the fourteenth amendment are not
easy of classification. Some cases seem to turn on the lack of standards, 22 some on
discriminatory application of otherwise valid laws,2 3 and some on the grounds that
their necessary purpose and effect is to accomplish a prohibited result.2 4 There is
no indication that Chapter 33 is lacking in standards and no evidence that the
sanctions of the law were discriminatorily applied. The effects of the law seem to
present the only grounds for challenge.
It is axiomatic that the courts will not consider the motives by which a state
legislature was actuated.2,5 The purpose and effect of an enactment, however, is
considered.26 The distinction between the two inquiries is so subtle that it is per-
haps insubstantial. The recent segregation cases indicate that purpose is synonymous
with effect,27 and if the necessary and intended effect of the legislative action is
to accomplish a prohibited result, one which could not be accomplished directly,
the law will be declared invalid. Thus, when the only effect of laws valid on their
face is to keep Negro children out of all white schools, 28 or to exclude only Negroes
from a municipality and from their franchise in the municipality,29 the laws are
struck down by the courts.
In Harrison, the court was faced, therefore, with the effect of the statute in
question. Although it was enacted as part of the "massive resistance laws," 30 it
does not seem to have the effect of accomplishing a prohibited result. The statute
does not seek to deny the Negro the right to integrate, nor does it deny the right
of Negroes to seek legal enforcement of that right. By declaring Chapter 36 un-
problems is an open question. See e.g. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcs 161-68 (1953); McCracken,
Observance by the Bar of Stated Professional Standards, 37 VA. L. REv. 399 (1951); In-formative Opinion of the Committee on Unauthorized Practice of the Law, 36 A.B.A.J. 677(1950); Weihofen, "Practice of Law by Non-Pecuniary Corporations": A Social Utility, 2
U. CHI. L. REv. 119 (1934).
21 116 S.E.2d 55, 69. The Virginia court explicitly recognizes freedom of association
which, with the plethora of civil rights litigation and the attempts in some states to impede
the activities of the NAACP, has been frequently asserted. See Freedom of Association, 4
RAcE REL. L. REP. 207 (1959); AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, ASSAULT UPON FREEDOM OF
AssociATioN (1957); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958).
22 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885).
23 Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
24 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 4042 (1960); Miller v. Milwaukee, 272
U.S. 713 (1926); James v. Almond, 170 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Va. 1959); James v. Duck-
worth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1959); Beckett v. School Board of the City of Norfolk,
185 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1960).
25 341 U.S. 367 (1950).
26 James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342, 350 (E.D. Va. 1959); NAACP v. Patty, 159
F. Supp. 503, 515 (E.D. Va. 1958).
27 Ibid.
28 James v. Duckworth, 170 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Va. 1959).
29 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 29 U.S.L. WEEK 4042 (1960).
30 NAACP v. Patty, 159 F. Supp. 503, 515 (E.D. Va. 1958).
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constitutional, the Virginia court has assured the NAACP that it may continue to
urge members to sue and it may assist them financially in maintaining suits. The
only effect of Chapter 33 is that it regulates the manner in which such suits may
be instituted. This would seem to be precisely the type of thing which the states,
under their police power, are entitled to do.
So long as basic rights may still be enforced in the courts, by proper parties
following traditional procedures for instituting suits, there would seem to be no
violation of the equal protection or due process requirements of the Constitution.
Justices Brennan and Douglas, by their dissent in Harrison v. NAACP,3' may have
indicated that they consider Chapter 33, as well as all other "massive resistance'
laws," to be invalid. However, considering the Supreme Court's reluctance to pass
on these statutes in the first place, and a traditionally broad state control of the
legal profession, it is doubtful that a majority will reverse the Supreme Court of
Virginia, if the case again reaches the United States Supreme Court.
Cornelius Collins
LABoR LAW - DISCRIMINATION - STATE FAR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE ACTS
AND MULTI-STATE EMPLOYERS. - Fair Employment Practice legislation was, at
the beginning, a federal experiment. In 1941, President Roosevelt created a com-
mission to purge the defense industries of discrimination. Created by executive
order,1 that body and its successors under the Truman and Eisenhower administra-
tions have lacked the sanction of legislation. But, if FEPC on the federal level has
made little substantial headway, its growth in the states has been phenomenal.
In 1945, New York enacted the Ives-Quinn Act,2 the first comprehensive
FEPC statute and the model for most that have followed. Within 15 years of the
New York legislative venture, 17 states have passed FEPC legislation, providing
for administrative bodies, full enforcement powers and broad remedies, both civil
and criminal.3 California, Delaware and Ohio were added to the list within the
last two years. Almost surely, more will come.
Eight additional states, in addition to Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia,
have some legislation relating to employment discrimination. 4 Municipalities and
the federal government continue to be significant factors in the over-all FEPC
picture.
31 360 U.S. 167, 179-84 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
1 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
2 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1945, ch. 118, § 1.
3 ALAKA Coup. LAws ANN. §§ 43-5-1 to 43-5-10 (Supp. 1958); CAL. LAB. CODE
§§ 1410-32 (Supp. 1959); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 80-24-1 to 80-24-8 (Supp. 1957);
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rxv. §§ 31-122 to 128 (1958); Delaware's statute is reported in CCH
LAB. L. REP., 1 STATE LAWS f47,500; MAss. ANN. LAws, ch. 151B, §§ 1-10 (1957); MrcE.
STAT. ANN. § 17.458(1)-(11) (1960); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01 to .13 (1957); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 18:25-1 to 28 (Supp. 1960); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-4-1 to 14 (1953);
N.Y. ExEc. LAws §§ 290-301; OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01-.08, 09 (Page Supp..
1960); ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 659.010-.990 (Supp. 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963
(Supp. 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§- 28-5-1 to 39 (1956), age and sex: §§ 28-6-1 to
28-6-21 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 49.60.010 to .320 (Supp. 1959); Wis. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, §§ 111.31 to 38 (Supp. 1960).
4 Aiuz. REv. STAT. §§ 23-371-75 (1956); District of Columbia: policy ordered by Board
of Commissioners on Oct. 26, 1953, reported in CCH LAB. L. REp., 1 STATE LAWS, ff43,030;
Illinois: Public Works, ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 29, §§ 17 to 24g (Smith-Hurd 1953), as amended
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960); Human Relations Commission: ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 127, §§ 214.1
to 5 (Smith-Hurd 1953); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 40-2301 to 2306 (1952), as amended (Supp.
1960); Iowa: Senate Concurrent Resolution, April 25, 1955, reported in CCH LAB. L.
REP., 1 STATE LAWS, 47,500; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1001 to 1008 (Supp. 1957);
LA. REv. STAT. R.S. 23:893 (1950); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-215-216 (1960); Nevada:
public works, NEv. REv. STAT. § 338.125 (1959); apprenticeship programs, ch. 76, L. 1960,
reported in CCH LAB. L. REP., 2 STATE LAws 43,035; LAWS OF PUERTO RIco ANN. tit.
29, §§ 146-151 (Supp. 1959).
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Without question, these laws present a significant problem to employers doing
business in a number of FEPO states. In addition to basic employment policies,
application- forms, advertisements for employment, promotion, demotion, salaries,
retirement age and pension plans are directly affected and, to some extent, regulated
by these codes. Even though most of the comprehensive statutes have followed the
New York example, there are substantial differences in the scope, administration
and enforcement of the laws in the various states.
The basic objective of this review is to analyze the FEPC statutes from the
viewpoint of corporate compliance. Accordingly, policy arguments have, in general,
been avoided.
This study provides an initial, over-all guide for use by corporate staffs, both
legal and otherwise, engaged in the problems of complying with the mass of FEPC
legislation.5
General Scope of FEPC Legislation
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin all have comprehensive fair employment
codes.
The "comprehensive" code has, as its basic objective, the elimination of dis-
crimination, based on race, color, creed or national origin, in employment practices.
Generally, the codes apply to private employers, employment agencies and labor
unions. Some states have included age discrimination; 6 it has generally been a late
entry. Age provisions present special problems, and are worthy of separate treatment.
Administrative bodies, often called Fair Employment Practice Commissions or
Anti-Discrimination Commissions, are established by the comprehensive statutes.
They have a twofold function: education and enforcement. Finally, the compre-
hensive statute includes the powers of enforcement. Two remedies are generally
available to the commission: court order or criminal proceedings. As the chart in-
dicates, many of the states have included both remedies.7
The court order is the most broad and flexible remedy available. Once a com-
mission has made a finding of discrimination, it issues a cease and desist order.
Such an order can, negatively, prohibit certain discriminatory practices; it can also,
affirmatively, order the adoption of other practices, e.g., the hiring of the applicant,
filing of reports, etc. After issuing its order, the commission seeks court enforcement
of it; if the court validates the order, violation of it is contempt of the court. Sum-
mary proceedings are then available to the court to mete out fine or imprisonment
or both to violators. In addition, the enforcing court maintains jurisdiction over
the employer.
Alternatively, the commission may ask the state prosecuting authorities to
proceed criminally against the violator of a commission order. Generally, the
penalties for a wilful violation are fine and imprisonment, or both.
Seven states and the District of Columbia have miscellaneous anti-discrimina-
tion legislation. The Louisiana statute is limited to age discrimination. Indiana and
Kansas have statutes which, with but one important exception, appear to be compre-
hensive FEPC statutes; the exception is that they are entirely without provisions
for enforcement. The Iowa law is merely a declaration of policy in the form of
a legislative resolution.
Arizona, Illinois and Nevada have statutes prohibiting discrimination in public
5 See 3 RACE REL. L. REP. 1085 (1958) and 5 RACE REL. L. REP. 569 (1960) for good
general surveys of all FEPC legislation.
6 Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wisconsin and Puerto Rico.
7 Alaska, California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Washington and Wisconsin.
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STATE FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES STATUTES
State Date Enforcement Agency
Alaska 1953 Comm,*sioner of Labor
Arizona 1955
California 1959
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of
Columbia
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Louisiana
Massachusetts
Michigan 1955
Minnesota 1955
Nebraska 1943
Nevada 1959
1960
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
Ohio
Fair Employment Practice
Commission
Anti-Discrimination
Commission
Commission on Civil Rights
Division Against Discrimination
Labor Commission
Commission of Labor
none
Anti-Discrimination
Com son
Commission Against
Discrimination
Fair Employment Practice
Commission
Fair Employment Practice
Commison
1945 Division on Civil Rights,
State Dept. of Education
1949 Fair Employment Practice
Commission
1945 State Commission Against
Discrimination
1959 Civil Rights Commission
Oregon 1949 Fair Employment Practices
Division, Bureau of Labor
Pennsylvania 1955 Fair Employment Practice
Commi ion
Puerto Rico 1959 Secretary of Labor
Rhode Iland 1949 Commision Against
Discrimination
Washington 1949 State Board Against
Discrimination in Employment
Wisconsin 1945 Industrial Commission
Penalties
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order
court order
fine and/or
imprisonment
none
none
none
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order
court order
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
double damages;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine and/or
imprisonment
court order;
fine
Age Narrow Statutes Only
over 45
public contractors;
state government
public works
1) public works and
defense industries;
2) Interracial Commission
under 50
45-65
defense industries
1) public works;
2) discrimination prohibited
in apprenticeship programs
45-65
25-65
40-62
30-65
45-65
40-65
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works. To that, Illinois adds a provision against discrimination in defense industries;
Illinois also has an Interracial Commission with investigative and cooperative
authority but without enforcement powers. Nebraska prohibits discrimination in
defense industries. Nevada has a special provision affirmatively stating that the
apprenticeship program shall be open to all without regard to race, creed, color and
national origin; the public works provision of that state also prohibits discrimination
on the basis of sex. Generally, the statutes of these seven states present no problem
to employers, with the exception of those engaged in public works or defense con-
tracts.
There are some general exemptions to the comprehensive codes. Generally,
small employers (e.g., with from four to eight employees) are not affected; clubs,
fraternal organizations and various associations and corporations not organized for
profit are exempted. Domestic servants are, generally, not included.
The most troublesome exemption is the "bona fide occupational qualification,"
which is generally provided for in the statutes. The legislators recognized that,
in some cases, religious background, national origin or, where applicable, age are
vitally important in particular occupations. For example, the New York Commis-
sion held that the country of origin was a valid consideration in the employment
of foreign language teachers."
Comparison of Comprehensive Statutes
Drafters of most of the comprehensive statutes appear to have followed the
New York code. There are differences, but few are substantial. The objective in
this section is to take a close look at the New York act, passed in 1945, and com-
pare it with the California code, enacted in 1959.
Commission Operations: The New York statute provides for a chairman and
five commissioners; each job is a full-time occupation. Commission offices are
located in four cities9 and advisory community councils are organized throughout
the state. The State Commission Against Discrimination (SCAD) operates a broad
educational program to advise the public of its activities and its availability.
In California, the commission is organized within the Department of Industrial
Relations. There are five commissioners who, presumably, devote only a part of
their time to the commission.' Unlike New York, California provides for an execu-
tive head apart from the commission chairman."' Offices are maintained in San
Francisco and Los Angeles.
Exemptions: Under New York law, employers with fewer than six employees
are excluded from the act; the number is five in California."2 Social clubs, fraternal,
charitable, educational and religious organizations or corporations are exempt if
not organized for profit purposes in New York.'3 The California law is, in substance,
similar.14 Both New York and California exclude domestic servants, and Cali-
fornia adds "agricultural workers residing on the land where they are employed
as farm workers" to the list of exemptions.' 5
Scope: Relating to employers, the basic prohibitions of the codes are similar.
They prohibit employment discrimination based on race, creed, color and national
origin or ancestry. In addition, they prohibit the use of advertisements or forms
which indicate such a discriminatory policy.
8 35 MIcH. STATE B. J. 41, 47 (May 1956).
9 Albany, Syracuse, New York and Buffalo.
10 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1416 (Supp. 1959), provides that the commissioners shall serve
without compensation; they receive a per diem expense payment of $50 plus expenses.
11 CAL. LAB. LAWS § 1415 (Supp. 1959); that job, unlike that of a commissioner in
California, is a full-time occupation.
12 N.Y. ExEc. LAWS § 292(5); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413(d) (Supp. 1959).
13 N.Y. ExEC. LAWS § 292(5).
14 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413(d) (Supp. 1959).
15 N.Y. ExEc. LAWS § 292(6); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1413(e) (Supp. 1959).
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The California statute, which is patterned after that of New York and is
substantially the same, reads as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, unless based on a bona fide
occupational qualification...
a) For an employer, because of the race, religious creed, color, national
origin, or ancestry of any person, to refuse to hire or employ him or to bar
or to discharge from employment such person, or to discriminate against
such person, in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employ-
ment....
c) For any employer or employment agency to print or circulate or cause
to be printed or circulated any publication, or to use any form of application
for employment or to make any inquiry in connection with prospective em-
ployment, which expresses, directly or indirectly, any limitations, specifica-
tion or discrimination as to race, religious creed, color, national origin, or
ancestry or any intent to make any such limitation, specification or dis-
crimination.' 6
Procedure and Enforcement: In New York any person who has been aggrieved
by a discriminatory practice may file a complaint with the commission. "Person"
is defined to include organizations. In addition, the attorney general and the Indus-
trial Commission may file complaints. The complaint must be fied within 90 days
of the alleged act of discrimination.
If the investigating commissioner finds probable cause for discrimination, he
attempts to find a solution through the processes of conference, conciliation and
persuasion. If either party has objection to the terms of the conciliation, provision
is made for appeal to the commission.
If a solution cannot be reached by the informal proceedings, a hearing is
held by the commission. The hearing is typical of similar administrative procedure;
for example, strict rules of evidence are not followed. The commission has authority
to subpoena witnesses and require evidence to be brought to the hearing. If the
commission finds an unfair or discriminatory employment practice, it issues a cease
and desist order. The order may prohibit certain discriminatory activities, and
require, affirmatively, hiring, reinstatement, back pay, reporting and changes in
employment practices.' 7
Under the judicial review provisions, the commission is given the power to
seek a court order for the enforcement of the terms of the commission order. The
employer or the aggrieved party may appeal the decision and order of the commission
within 30 days.
Penal provisions are also included in the code, giving the commission the normal
choice of remedies. Violation of a commission order is a misdemeanor; the maxi-
mum penalty is imprisonment for one year or a fine of $500, or both.' 8 California's
statute carries a maximum criminal penalty at six months.' 9
The California FEPC legislation is almost identical to New York's in provisions
for enforcement, procedure and penalties for violations.
Section 1422 of the California statute provides a one-year statute of limitations
on filing complaints; unlike California, section 297 of the New York act makes the
limit three months. Moreover, California allows a 90-day extension if the ag-
grieved party did not have the facts or the knowledge of the discriminatory act
within the one-year period.
Effect on Application Forms - Rulings: Both New York and California have
published rulings for employers governing what may and may not be included on
16 CA.. LAB. CODE § 1420(a), (c) (Supp. 1959); N.Y. ExEa. Laws § 296(a), (c).
17 CAL. LAB. CODE § 1426 (Supp. 1959), deals with orders of the commission; it lists
some of the things the commission may include and is careful to note that the extent of
the order is not, of necessity, limited to that list.
18 N.Y. ExEc. LAws §§ 297-99, include the provisions for procedure, enforcement and
penalties for violations.
19 CAL. LAB. LAws § 1430 (Supp. 1959).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
application forms for employment.2- In New York, the following questions or
blanks are prohibited:
1) Original name of applicant;
2) birth place of applicant;
3) birth certificate, naturalization or baptismal record (It is, however,
lawful to require statement of age);
4) religion, religious affiliations, church parish, pastor, or religious holi-
days observed (It is unlawful to state that, "This is a Catholic,
Jewish or Protestant organization");
5) complexion or color of skin;
6) requirement or option of attaching photograph; requirement of photo
after interview but before hiring;
7) country of which applicant is a citizen (It is, however, lawful to ask
whether applicant is a citizen of the United States) ;
8) citizenship of applicant's parents or spouse (It is, however, lawful to
ask whether they are citizens of the United States) ;
9) lineage, ancestry, national origin, descent, parentage, nationality, or
nationality of applicant's parents or spouse;
10) language commonly used by applicant (It is lawful to ask what lan-
guages are written or spoken fluently by the applicant; it is, on the
other hand, unlawful to ask why the applicant acquired the ability to
use other languages);
11) name or address of applicant's relatives, other than father and mother,
husband or wife or minor, dependent children;
12) name and address of nearest relative to be notified in case of accident
or emergency (It is lawful to ask name of person to be notified);
13) applicant's general military experience;
14) list of all clubs, societies and lodges to which applicant belongs
(It is lawful to ask for a list of organizations, the names of which do
not indicate race, creed, color or national origin of members).
The New York Commission, in its Annual Report for 1954, reported an illus-
trative case dealing with photographs. The employer in the case used an applica-
tion form which included a space for a picture with the notation "required unless
contrary to local legislation." The commission ruled that such a practice did not
comply with its anti-discrimination law.21
As previously noted, the California and New York statutes provide for a bona
fide occupational qualification. The procedure to be followed, where an employer
needs some prohibited information for good purpose, is to request an advisory
opinion from the commission.
Litigation
Few cases dealing with FEPC statutes have been reported. 2 One reason is
the elaborate conciliation procedure that is an integral part of FEPC. In those
cases which have been decided, the anti-discrimination statutes have suffered few
setbacks.
The United States Supreme Court has never been called upon to determine
the constitutional validity of an existing FEPC statute. The Court did, however,
unanimously uphold the predecessor to the New York code in Railway Mail Associ-
ation v. Corsi.23 The statute prohibited racial discrimination by a labor organization.
The appellant association had a policy of admitting only whites as members. The
20 Material on "Guides" reported in CCH LAB. L. REP., 1 STATE LAWS 47,511; 2
STATE LAWS 47,507. See also 1 STATE LAWS 47,550 for some variations from the New
York pattern.
21 Matter of American Stores Company, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE STATE CommISsION
AGAINST DIscRIMINATION, NEW YORK (1954).
22 Some jurisdictions have included housing provisions in the basic anti-discrimination
statutes. For recent cases dealing with housing, where the commissions have been upheld,
see Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (1960),
Evans v. Ross, 57 N.J. Super. 223, 154 A.2d 441 (1959), and McKinley Park Homes v.
Commission on Civil Rights, 20 Conn. Sup. 167, 129 A.2d 235 (1957). Though outside
the scope of this note, these cases are helpful in studying judicial treatment of FEPC codes.
23 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
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main attack on the statute was that it was an interference with the association's right
of selection of membership and abridgement of its property rights and liberty of
contract, in violation of the due process clause of the 14th amendment.
The majority opinion, written by Mr. Justice Reed, indicates that a future
attack on FEPC would not succeed:
We have here a prohibiting of discrimination in membership or union
services on account of race, creed or color. A judicial determination that
such legislation violated the Fourteenth Amendment would be a distortion
of the policy manifested in that amendment, which was adopted to prevent
state legislation designed to perpetuate discrimination on the basis of race or
color. We see no constitutional basis for the contention that a state cannot
protect workers from exclusion solely on the basis of race, color or creed
by an organization, functioning under the protection of the state, which
holds itself out to represent the general business needs of employees. 24
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter indicated a broader basis of
support for anti-discrimination legislation:
... a State may choose to put its authority behind one of the cherished
aims of American feeling by forbidding indulgence in racial or religious
prejudice to another's hurt. To use the Fourteenth Amendment as a sword
against such State power would stultify that Amendment.25
One of the earliest state decisions concerning FEPC legislation is the Connecti-
cut case of Draper v. Clark Dairies, Inc.2 0 The dairy advertised for help and the
complainant, a Negro, applied. He was not hired, but three whites, who applied
later, were employed. The Connecticut commission found discrimination, and issued
a cease and desist order which compelled the dairy to employ the Negro applicant.
The court upheld the finding, but modified the order to prevent discrimination,
on the basis of race, if the complainant applied for employment with the dairy in
the future.
In another Connecticut decision, 27 the commission found a union guilty of
discriminatory practices in refusing to admit Negroes to membership. A cease and
desist order followed. But the union members voted not to admit the Negroes
because they had not complied with the union requirement of sponsorship and
employment by a union contractor. The court ignored the stated reasons, held
the union in contempt, and fined it $1,000. In addition, the court gave the union
30 days to comply; for every week after that period in which the order was violated,
a fine of $250 was to have been imposed.
In Holland v. Edwards,25 the New York commission was upheld in finding an
employment agency guilty of discriminatory practices. Among those practices was the
use of an application form which required the disclosure of racial and religious
information. The commission put the agency under its "continuing supervision"
for one year, and required it to maintain elaborate records for commission perusal.
The court did not rule specifically on the "continuing supervision" imposed by the
commission, but indicated that it would not interfere unless the commission remedy
was unreasonable.
In Ross v. Arbury,29 the authority of the New York commission to order a
business establishment to post notices pertaining to the New York statute was upheld.
In 1957, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that a formal commission hearing is
24 Id. at 93-94.
25 Id. at 98. On the question of the constitutionality of FEPC statutes, see Waite,
Constitutionality of Proposed Minnesota Fair Employment Practices Act, 32 MINN. L. Rzv.
349 (1948); 5 RAcE REL. L. Rne. 569 (1960).
26 17 Conn. Sup. 93 (1950).
27 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Commission on Civil Rights, 140
Conn. 537, 102 A.2d 366 (1953).
28 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
29 206 Misc. 74, 133 N.Y.S.2d 62, 119 N.E.2d 557 (1954).
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not necessary when, in the opinion of the investigating commissioner, the evidence
is not reasonably sufficient to support the complaint.30
In 1957, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin refused to uphold an order of the
State Industrial Commission compelling a union to admit Negro applicants.3'
The court held that the Wisconsin FEPC statute lacked enforcement provisions;
the code was merely a public policy declaration. The Wisconsin legislature has,
subsequently, amended the statute to put teeth into its policy statement.3 2
A particularly interesting case is pending at the present time in Colorado.3
3
Continental Air Lines was found to be in violation of the Colorado statute by re-
fusing to hire a Negro as a pilot. Moreover, the commission found Continental's
application form, on which is required information concerning race, and the sub-
mission of a photograph, to be discriminatory. The commission ordered Continental
to hire the complainant for the next training school. On appeal, the commission
encountered procedural difficulties, and the case has not been determined on the
merits. If the commission's order is upheld, it should be a significant precedent in
extending affirmative remedies available to anti-discrimination commissions.
Perhaps the most interesting case in this entire area is American Jewish Con-
gress v. Carter,3 4 a New York case which is still pending. The New York commission
held that the Arabian-American Oil Co. (Aramco) could properly inquire into
the religion of applicants for employment as a "bona fide occupational qualification."
The King of Saudi Arabia prohibits the employment of Jews in that country, and
service with Aramco includes the possibility of assignment to Saudi Arabia. The
American Jewish Congress applied for an order annulling the decision of the
commission.
In a stinging opinion, the Supreme Court, Special Term, reversed the com-
mission: "The film of oil which blurs the vision of Aramco has apparently affected
the respondent Commission in this case."35
Aramco cannot defy the declared public policy of New York State and
violate its statute within New York State no matter what the King of Saudi
Arabia says. New York State is not a province of Saudi Arabia, nor is the
constitution and statute of New York State to be cast aside to protect the
oil profits of Aramco.36
The Appellate Division remanded the case to the commission for "further
processing." The court declined to discuss the merits. Even though a final decision
has not been rendered at this writing, the opinion of the New York Supreme Court
indicates a disposition to uphold FEPO, no matter what the practical difficulties
may be.
Age Discrimination
Age discrimination provisions are a relatively new feature in FEPC legislation.
Massachusetts initiated the trend in 1950; a total of ten states now have age dis-
crimination provisions. 37
Generally, the statutes forbid discrimination against persons in given age
brackets. Delaware, Massachusetts, New York and Rhode Island prohibit discrimi-
nation against workers between the ages of 45 and 65; the age bracket in Connecticut
30 Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 3 A.D.2d 514, 162 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1957), modified 4 N.Y.2d
238, 173 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1958).
31 Ross v. Ebert, 275 Wis. 523, 82 N.W.2d 315 (1957).
32 Wis. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 111.36 (Supp. 1960).
33 Colorado Anti-Discrimination Comm'n v. Continental Air Lines, 355 P.2d 83 (Colo.
1960).
34 190 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1959), modified, 10 A.D.2d 833, 199 N.Y.S.2d 157 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
35 See Recent Decision, 35 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 443 (1960).
36 190 N.Y.S.2d 218, 221-22.
37 For discussion of related problems dealing with age discrimination, see Note, 61 YALE
L. REv. 547 (1952), and Meiners, Fair Employment Practices Legislation, 62 Dici. L. Rv.
60 (1958).
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and Wisconsin is 40-65; it is 25-65 in Oregon, 40-62 in Pennsylvania, 30-65 in
Puerto Rico, and 18-60 in Colorado. Alaska prohibits discrimination against workers
over 45. Though not as part of an FEPC statute, Louisiana prohibits discrimination
against workers under the age of 50.
Again, New York state will be used as an example of the enforcement provisions
established with regard to the policy against age discrimination.. The New York
commission has published a comprehensive set of rulings, called "working presump-
tions. 38
An application form may contain a question about age in New York if two
conditions are met: 1) the inquiry must be made in good faith - presumably with
reference to a bona fide occupational qualification; and, 2) the application form
must note that New York law prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.
Three conditions have been established for the determination of bona fide
occupational qualifications. First age must be a bona fide factor in connection with
job performance; second, the age limitations must be a bona fide factor in ap-
prentice training or an on-the-job training program of long duration; and, third,
age must be a bona fide factor in fulfilling the provisions of other statutes (e.g.,
minimum age requirements).
New York has established a special procedure with reference to exceptions to
the age provisions. An employer may file with the commission a statement, sup-
ported by facts, claiming the existence of a bona fide qualification. When such a
statement has been filed in good faith, the employer may put such an age qualifica-
tion into effect. If the commission, in reviewing the practice, decides it does not
meet its standards, it notifies the employer and gives him an opportunity to change
the practice.
With reference to advertisements, New York provides that the general test
is whether the advertisement indicates a barrier excluding applicants over a particu-
lar age. But the actual rulings go further. It is, for example, unlawful, in the com-
mission's view, to use the word "young" in an advertisement.
Pre-employment physical examinations are permitted if the minimum stand-
ards used are reasonably necessary for the work involved, and if they are uni-
formly applied to all applicants.
A general policy of forced resignation at the age of 60 is suspect. Such a
policy is unlawful, the commission has ruled, unless the employer can establish
two conditions. First, it must be shown that the physical attributes of workers
over 60 are harmful to their work. Second, it must be impractical to pass upon
an individual employee's qualifications. Of course, the burden will be on the em-
ployer to establish both conditions.
A compulsory age specification for retirement is lawful if the policy or plan
was established before July 1, 1958, and if the employer provides at least partial
retirement benefits. The employer beginning a new retirement plan must justify
the reasonableness of a compulsory retirement age in relation to the employer's
over-all employment policy and the particular occupational category to which it
applies.
Where a retirement plan does not include benefits provided by the employer,
certain conditions have been established, upon which the good faith of the age
specification will be judged. Among those conditions are: (1) the date the policy
was established; (2) the history of administration of the policy; (3) whether or
when the policy was reduced to writing and made known to employees and appli-
cants; and, (4) the reasonableness of the specific compulsory retirement age in
relation to the employer's over-all employment policy and the particular occupa-
tional qualifications to which it applies.
An employer may not reject an applicant for employment merely because
38 CCH LAB. L. REP., 2 STATE LAWS f47,507.
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he is above the maximum age for entrance into the retirement plan. Of course,
the applicant, in those circumstances, has no right to be admitted to coverage
under the policy or plan.
It is important to note, with reference to the above-mentioned New York
rulings, that there are no reported cases wherein such rulings have been sub-
jected to judicial review. No other "age states" have passed comparable com-
prehensive rulings. There are, however, differences in application of the laws in
the various states.
In Oregon, an applicant may be required to state his or her age.39 In Penn-
sylvania, age proof in the form of certificates of age or work permits issued by
school authorities may be required. 40 Similarly, Rhode Island allows certificates
of age to be required. 4 The Massachusetts commission has ruled that an appli-
cant may be required to give his or her age if the requirement is based on a bona
fide occupational qualification, or when necessary to satisfy minimum age law
requirements, or when necessary to check for honesty, or a criminal record.42
It would seem that a statement on the application form that "said question
may be answered if not contrary to local law" would answer the problem pre-
sented by variations in the age states. Generally, however, the commissions have
ruled that such statements are not sufficient to remove the question from being
considered as a violation.
Some of the variations with regard to what is allowed for advertisement
purposes are subtle. For example, Pennsylvania allows the use of the phrases:
"college student wanted," "Korean veteran preferred," "recent high school grad-
uate," and "recent college graduate." These are allowed because "it is conceivable
that individuals between the ages of 40 and 62 may be included." On the other
hand, use of the word "young" is prohibited.43
There are no reported cases dealing with the age discrimination provisions
in any of the states. Perhaps their novelty is one reason. It is suspected that an-
other reason is that many employers prefer settlement to litigation.44
Federal Provisions
The first Fair Employment Practice Committee was established by President
Roosevelt in 1941 .4 That committee went out of existence at the end of World
War II. In 1951, President Truman established the Committee on Government
Contract Compliance.4 6 President Eisenhower changed the name of the com-
mittee in 1953, 47 and approved a revised provision for government contracts in
1954.48 Vice President Richard Nixon was chairman of the committee during the
Eisenhower administration; Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson is its present
chairman.
The last Eisenhower order directs all government contracting agencies to in-
clude the following non-discrimination clause in all contracts:
In connection with the performance of work under this contract, the con-
tractor agrees not to discriminate against any employee or applicant for
employment because of race, religion, color or national origin. The aforesaid
provision shall include, but not be limited to, the following: employment,
upgrading, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising;
39 Id. at 47,550.
40 Id. at 47,660.
41 Id. at 47,550.
42 COH LAB. L. REP., 1 STATE LAWS 47,550.
43 CCH LAB. L. REP., 2 STATE LAWS 47,670.
44 See, for example, case no. AVI-1-A, Massachusetts Annual Report 9-10 (1956), 2
RAca REL. L. REP. 734, 736 (1957); 5 RAcE REL. L. REP. 569, 589-90 (1960).
45 Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
46 Exec. Order No. 10308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12303 (1951).
47 Exec. Order No. 10479, 18 Fed. Reg. 4899 (1953).
48 Exec. Order No. 10557, 19 Fed. Reg. 5655 (1954).
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layoff or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and
selection for training including apprenticeship. The contractor agrees to
post hereafter in conspicuous places, available for employees and applicants
for employment, notices to be provided by the contracting officer setting
forth the provisions of the nondiscrimination clause.
The contractor further agrees to insert the foregoing provision in all sub-
contracts hereunder, except subcontracts for standard commercial supplies
or raw materials. 49
There are two types of contracts in which the nondiscrimination clause need
not be included: contracts and subcontracts to be performed outside the United
States where no recruitment of workers within the United States is involved; and
contracts and subcontracts to meet other special requirements or emergencies, if
recommended by the committee. 0
The committee rules provide that any person or organization with knowledge
of a failure of a federal contractor to comply with the nondiscrimination clause
may file a complaint. The committee then transmits the complaint to the appro-
priate contracting agency, which processes the complaint in accordance with the
agency's procedure for handling complaints. Since 1954, the committee has re-
ceived 888 complaints.51 Considering the magnitude of government contracts, that
number is not large.
The committee itself has no power to invoke remedies for non-compliance
by government contractors; that responsibility is placed on the contracting officers
of the various agencies. Presumably, the most effective remedy available to the
contracting officers is cancellation of the contract. The committee reports no in-
stances of cancelled contracts.
A compliance survey program is operated by the Government Contracts Com-
mittee. The survey includes a physical examination of the contractor's plant, an
examination of the employment practices followed, and an evaluation of com-
pliance with the nondiscrimination clause. Roughly 500 contractors are surveyed
each year.5 2 Of interest in the 1958-59 Report is the policy statement, by the com-
mittee, that it will emphasize the integration of minority groups into white-collar
positions.5 3
There is only one reported case dealing with the current nondiscrimination
clause.54 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the
evidence sustained the holding of the lower court that the plaintiff had been
discharged not because of his race, but because of a reduction of the work force
and the fact that his work was unsatisfactory.
There have been repeated attempts to enact a federal Fair Employment
Practice Code; the first such attempt was made in 1942. To date, none has been
successful.55 However, the Democratic platform for the recent general election
called for a federal FEPC.
Municipal Ordinances
Although many cities have ordinances prohibiting discrimination in employ-
ment, only 29 municipalities have provided for enforcement machinery and penal-
ties for violations. These ordinances, with two exceptions,5 cover private employers,
49 Ibid.
50 Id. at §§ 2(a), (b).
51 Report of the Committee on Government Contracts 22 (1953-58).
52 Report of the Committee on Government Contracts 8-10 (1958-59).
53 Id. at 5.
54 Taylor v. Peter Kiewit & Sons Co., 271 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1959).
55 For thorough studies of attempts to enact a federal FEPC, see RUCHAMES, RACE,
Jos & PoLrTIcs at 199-213 (1953), and KESSELMAN, THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF FEPC
(1948).
56 The Chicago ordinance is limited to employers; the Milwaukee ordinance does not
include labor unions.
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labor unions and employment agencies. The cities are as follows:'7
Campbell, Ohio Monessen, Pa.
Chicago, Ill. Niles, Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio Philadelphia, Pa.
Duluth, Minn. Pittsburgh, Pa.
East Chicago, Ind. Pontiac, Mich.
Erie, Pa. River Rouge, Mich.
Farrell, Pa. St. Paul, Minn.
Gary, Ind. San Francisco, Calif.
Girard, Ohio Sharon, Pa.
Hamtramck, Mich. Steubenville, Ohio
Hubbard, Ohio Struthers, Ohio
Lorain, Ohio Toledo, Ohio
Lowellville, Ohio Warren, Ohio
Milwaukee, Wis. Youngstown, Ohio
Minneapolis, Minn.
The validity of municipal FEPC ordinances is open to serious question. First,
they may be challenged on the grounds that the local government may not legis-
late in the area of employment practices without express authority. Second, the
state, because of its own anti-discrimination legislation, may claim pre-emption of
the field. 58
The Attorney General of Kansas has ruled that a municipality may not pass
an ordinance prohibiting housing discrimination without express authority; pre-
sumably, this would hold true for employment discrimination laws as well. The
attorneys-general of Michigan and New Jersey have declared that city ordinances
in those states have been superseded by the state legislation. 59
The Pennsylvania statute, on the other hand, has specifically provided that
the city ordinances will remain valid. 60 The Attorney General of Minnesota has
ruled that city ordinances consistent with state laws are permissible.61
There are no reported cases determining the validity of city ordinances regu-
lating employment practices.
Conclusion
It must be emphasized that this survey is only general; it does not purport
to cover all of the variations in the enforcement rulings of the anti-discrimination
commissions. Focus was placed on the New York law because it is the model that
most codes have followed and, it is believed, a general policy of compliance with
the New York statute will raise only minor problems with other FEPC laws.
While it may be a great defect in the structure of FEPC, the general scheme
of enforcement affords a loophole for counsel engaged in the problems of multi-
state compliance. That policy provides for investigation, conciliation, the court
order and judicial review - all of which give the corporation or the labor union
an opportunity to comply with a specific order before a penalty of fine or im-
prisonment attaches. There is, generally, no real problem of facing the penalties
of an FEPC violation until a specific order has been issued for the individual
employer or labor union. Certainly such procedures are helpful to counsel with
serious problems of compliance with some of the more technical rulings of the
various commissions. But, on the other hand, such procedure does, with little
question, allow employers and labor unions to virtually ignore the laws until
placed under a commission order. The cost of such machinery to the administrative
agency and the time that is lost makes the whole procedure of lesser benefit to
the complainant.
57 P-H EMPL. & LAB. REL. SERV., STATE LAWS %44,011.
58 3 RAcE REL. L. REP. 1106 (1958).
59 Id. at 1106-07.
60 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 962(b) (Supp. 1959).
61 P-H EMPL. & LAB. REL. SERv., STATE LAWS 44,012.
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Another general commission policy which, inevitably, leads to violations is the
great concern of the agencies with pre-employment and pre-interview policies. It
is easy enough for a complainant to show that the requirement of a photograph
on an application form or a question which would reveal religion is a clear violation
of the law. But it becomes more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, to show a
violation in the fact that an individual applicant has not been hired because of
his race, creed, or color. The expense of prosecuting such a claim of discrimina-
tion, and the enormous problems of proving the claim, remain a major defect
and stumbling block in the path of FEPC effectiveness.
But, it must be noted, these problems have not slowed, to any marked degree,
the phenomenal growth of FEPC and its administrative agencies. Even if their
effectiveness is open to serious question, these laws cannot be ignored in the face
of such growth and refinement. Michael E. Phenner
